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The Economics of the Eurozone
The Chronic ‘Flu’?
Drew Woodhouse
Lecturer in Economics
Sheffield Hallam University
For the last decade the media and economics community have become fa-
miliarly accustomed to narrating a poor performing Eurozone. Debt crises,
growth crises, disintegration talk and a rise in right wing politics have left
permanent scars on the credibility of the Euro currency. This is not surpris-
ing. Whilst periods of subtle respite, falls in monthly indicators is hardly
headline news. As of recent years, industrial production has fallen, as has
business confidence, along with retail-sales growth. Leading indicators for
GDP begin to decline in growth, suggesting that the trajectory of economic
progress is on the further decent. And this is 10 years after the ‘European
Debt Crisis’ began. After such a large period of what economists would
now call ‘hysteresis’ (some may call this a very shallow cycle), why does
the Eurozone continuously falter? Why is progress anaemic? It may not be
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hard to guess, but one issue is demanded sided; there is a lack of activity.
However more worryingly, the biggest issue is one of the ‘supply side’. The
context within which demand and growth is created is highly faulty. In other
words, the architecture of the Eurozone is dysfunctional and unsustainable
‘for’ growth. This area of contest has been heavily studied, particularly from
the economist’s lens. Economics often cites the ‘Optimum Currency Area’
theory of Robert Mundell to argue how the Eurozone is ‘not’ optimal. But
this is misleading and not empirically complete. This diagnostic synopsis will
consider the issues with the Eurozone, extending from the present dominance
of critiques you will read from mainstream academia.
The Eurozone Architecture - Chronic Flu
A set of ‘guiding’ principles outlined under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and
implemented in 1999, the problems of the Eurozone can be traced back to
these very rules. Politicians at the time were more focussed on the pro-
gression of the political ideology under the ‘European Project’ via monetary
integration without considerations of how it could be economically stable
and equitable. This is where the debates over the endemic Eurozone crisis
revolve. The main question that arises is whether ‘Europe is an optimum
currency area’? Robert Mundell applied the common definition of a cur-
rency area as a “domain within which exchange rates are fixed”. For him an
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optimum currency area is a region and not the nation, where he strikes vital
importance to the mobility of capital and labour. Europe needs high internal
factor mobility and high external factor immobility if it ‘is’ to be successful.
A (brief) synopsis of the theory would suggest that external shocks (for ex-
ample, global recessions) cannot be absorbed where European factors such as
labour cannot adjust or change. Due to limited labour mobility in Europe,
it is suggested that there is a higher risk of unemployment in the case that
both employees and employers cannot balance against economic shocks, such
as through firing workers. Labour is largely immobile for linguistic, economic
and cultural reasons. This is the common perspective, albeit stylised in sub-
tly different ways.
But this perspective is contradictory. The highly ‘immobile’ countries are
those that are more ‘successful’. The likes of Germany, Finland, Netherlands
and Austria fall into this category. These countries operate an export-led
growth model built on wage coordination, complementary use of vocational
training and generous welfare systems to protect against the investments in
skills. Yet the relatively more ‘mobile’ countries of ‘southern’ Europe are the
poor performing states. So why is this?
Firstly, from a regional perspective, the Eurozone is marred by poor per-
formance simply because they have combined too many countries that are
too economically dissimilar. Whilst this perspective is an encompassing fea-
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ture of the optimum currency areas, my reasoning is slightly different. The
way in which different nations accumulate growth is too varied, in the sense
that creates regional divisions, or in other words, a ‘two-speed’ Eurozone.
You have Northern Europe who can sustainably create a ‘high value-added’
industrial base, whereas Southern Europe is stylised by a ‘low value-added’
industrial base built on low cost labour. The reason this is can be studied
from the field of ‘political economy’, the combination of politics and eco-
nomics. The political economy of Northern Europe is designed as such that
industrial competitiveness can be maintained via a stabilisation of wages and
high export activity. Generally these exports are sold to the Southern Euro-
pean states, whose economies are based on consumption and as such private
debt. These countries cannot maintain competitiveness given they have little
means to adapt. Nonetheless, a slowing Germany generally means a slowing
Eurozone as competitiveness is the key differential through a capital transfer
cycle.
Secondly, from a national perspective, macroeconomic theory suggests
that countries can only adjust and maintain competitiveness through the
following mechanisms. Countries can change their exchange rates (external
devaluation), monetary policy stance, fiscal policy stance and/or through
wage moderation (internal devaluation). National Governments/authorities
of the Eurozone, since they are part of a single currency, give up some of these
mechanisms to adjust. They cannot devalue their currency, nor do they have
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power to change monetary policy, this is decided by the independent Eu-
ropean Central Bank. They have less power to change their fiscal policies,
this is a politically sensitive area (nationally and at the European level) and
one that is bound by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP - although very
few countries adhere to these ‘rules’). This leaves adjustments through wage
moderation as the only tool to maintain some competitiveness. In a short
sense this is where the problem lies. Germany and neighbours, with trade
unions work for the benefit of industries by stabilising wages at a level com-
mensurate such that the unit labour cost (ULC) is reduced or maintained.
Southern European states have more decentralised wage systems meaning a
lack of moderation. Relative unit labour cost adjusts upwards, with a re-
turning increasing real exchange rate, relative competitiveness declines. The
capital transfer cycle accelerates.
Structural Adjustments and Political Desire
This orientates the view that the Eurozone is merely fiscal towards a view
that labour market institutions matter through the ability of some countries
to shift their real exchange rate downwards (increasing relative competitive-
ness) via wage moderation. The issue is supply-sided. As such, the Eurozone
needs significant structural adjustment (an economist’s version of ‘gutting’)
and political will to do so. This does not seem an imminent agenda.
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